India’s Water Control Dilemma: Can It Truly Alter the Flow of the Indus River?

Tensions between India and Pakistan have surged after India suspended key components of the Indus Waters Treaty due to a recent attack in Kashmir. This raises critical questions about India's capability to halt the flow of the Indus River and its tributaries into Pakistan. Experts argue that substantial infrastructure limitations and potential consequences make it unlikely that India can effectively manipulate water flows, though the absence of treaty constraints could pose serious challenges for Pakistan, particularly in dry seasons.

The Indus River, a vital lifeline for both India and Pakistan, has become a focal point of conflict as India recently suspended its commitments under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). This treaty has historically provided a framework for water sharing between the two nations, enduring even through armed conflicts. The suspension comes in the wake of rising tensions following an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, prompting India to take a firmer stance against what it alleges to be Pakistani support for cross-border terrorism.

The IWT was designed to allocate water rights to six rivers within the Indus basin, allowing India usage of the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, while Pakistan retains control over the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. The geopolitical landscape has shifted, as India now contemplates potential revisions to the treaty in light of escalating demands on water resources, shifting climate conditions, and the pressing need for enhanced storage facilities.

Experts assert that India's ability to withhold substantial water volumes is severely constrained by the lack of adequate infrastructure capable of diverting the vast quantities of water flowing into Pakistan. Current hydropower projects in India primarily operate as run-of-the-river systems, meaning they do not store significant amounts of water, thereby limiting India's control over water flow. Despite calls for the construction of new storage facilities, the progress in infrastructure has been slow due to both technical and social challenges.

In light of the treaty's suspension, there is concern that India could now undertake actions that might restrict water flows without prior notification to Pakistan, potentially affecting agricultural and hydropower outputs during critical dry seasons. A lack of shared hydrological data, which is crucial for managing floods and water supply planning, raises alarms about water scarcity risks in Pakistan, which is heavily dependent on these resources.

The possibility of India controlling river flows also invites the notion of "weaponizing" water—a strategy where a country might deliberately manipulate water flow to exert pressure. However, experts maintain that for India to accomplish this without considerable risk of flooding its own territories would be challenging given the geographical layout.

Meanwhile, the broader regional context is complicated by water management issues involving China, which also has significant control over water resources that flow into India. India's apprehension grows with Chinese expansion of hydropower projects in Tibet, which directly influence river flow dynamics across borders and could exacerbate existing tensions.

Ultimately, while India appears emboldened to revisit its water-sharing practices with Pakistan, the practical implications of suspending the treaty are fraught with obstacles, posing potential risks not just to bilateral relations, but also to both countries' agricultural and environmental stability.